Muhammad Tariq

PhD Scholar, International Relations

Muslim Youth (MY) University Islamabad

The more prevalent and general perception about the conventional arms and nuclear weapons is that both have rather scarce connection in so far as its production, its use, its possession , acquisition and control are concerned. This is more a misconception rather than a deliberate or material difference between the two types of weapons. In the context of proliferation and instability that arises from nuclear weapons possession by a state its state of conventional weaponry is as much important as its nuclear capabilities are. Conventional arms superiority is as much a potential driver of nuclear proliferation and geostrategic instability as nuclear weapons are. But the concept of this nexus has been scarcely attended to by experts. There has been little attempt to describe the relationship between conventional arms and nuclear proliferation than nuclear arms and nuclear proliferation. This article is an attempt to bring into light the relationship between conventional arms and nuclear proliferation which if understood in the context of arms control can play a vital role in nuclear non-proliferation and the establishment of an era of nuclear peace.

What Conventional and Nuclear Weapons are?

Conventional arms include all types of arms other than weapons of mass destruction they are the most commonly used weapons used in conflicts and wars they include a wide range of equipment not limited to armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, small arms and light weapons, landmines, cluster munitions, ammunition and artillery. Conventional weapons are the most common type of armament globally and historically the most commonly used in conflict (1).

While non-conventional weapon are weapons not immediately thought of being a weapon this include biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms are based on the technique of release of a huge amount of energy form the nucleus of a radioactive atom mostly plutonium or uranium, which brings large scale devastation without any discrimination of the target it brings complete destruction as it leads to fission reaction and the radioactive decay the destroys everything it come in contact with. Nuclear fission remains in the atmosphere for a very long period and bring about genetic mutation in living things both animals and plants for centuries to come. The after effects of nuclear detonation are highly lethal and it affects the whole living plant and animal kingdoms. (2)

After the World War-II, when the world experienced the devastation that nuclear weapon can cause efforts for the containment of developing and proliferation of nuclear weapons were started and treaties were signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the major one. Despite efforts by the international community the spread of nuclear weaponization could not be stopped. The reasons are many the security dilemmas of states remained pervasive. While, nuclear non-proliferation still remains a focused area of international politics there is a strong relationship between the conventional and non-conventional weapons. The spread and development of one does affect the buildup of another and both affect interstate relationship in a meaningful manner. Balancing conventional military build ups creates an urge for acquisition of nuclear weapons. Infact it is the conventional war that ultimately leads to a nuclear attack the Second World War is an example of this. Similarly nuclear non-proliferation has a smoothening effect on the conventional arms race.(3)

The Importance of Conventional Arms Balance:

The history of conventional arms race is interesting from the point of its importance and the stability that its reduction or buildup brings in the international political system. The concept of arms race stems from the development, acquisition, transfer or possession of conventional arms in the first place. The inception of nuclear arms race is comparatively a recent phenomenon, mostly after 1945 when atomic bomb was used in the Second World War. In the post WW-II situation arms race has become a highly focused area in state policy making and national interests and security paradigm. The association of arms race with the nuclear arms race is infact based on the degree of destruction and the fear of another atomic war, and the development of nuclear capability by the second and third tier countries like India, Pakistan, gave it a more pervasive connection with arms race rather than the conventional arms race. (4)

For the past quarter of century conventional arms superiority has kept given the major world powers a motivation to overpower each other. For example the United States has enjoyed superiority in precision warfare over its competitors like China and Russia. Both China and Russia too has continuously tried to offset this balance by developing conventional arms at par with the US or even trying to do better than the US. But when it comes to nuclear weapons there is no such fierce race for developing or acquisition of nuclear arms. (5) There is a threshold limit in case of nuclear weapons after which most of the countries stop or slow down its development and there is not as much urge for its transfer to other states as there is in case of conventional arms. Infact, the sale purchase of conventional arms race is a booming business and there is a highly influential and vibrant private sector investment in the manufacturing of conventional arms in the US and Europe (6). In a global scenario where there may be fewer nuclear weapons but more conventional weapons will definitely be more challenging to the international community, in order to create a much safer world.

Generally speaking, acquisition of nuclear arms capability by smaller states is seen as a deterrence against the conventional arms superiority of bigger states especially the US in the global political arena. An example is the ambition of Saddam Hussiem to develop weapons of mass destruction to serve as deterrence against Iran and Israel in the 1970s (7). Hence, nuclear capable bigger states run into a dilemma in all such cases of how to contain the arms race and at the same time create stability in the arms regime.

Conventional and Nuclear Arms Race and Crisis Stability:

Nuclear arms race stability has a direct bearing on conventional arms race stability. Despite, the fact that there is a big amount of difference between the two. Conventional arms differ from nuclear arms in nearly all of its aspects, they differ in terms of its operations, organization, and above all the degree of destruction that both brings in. These differences brings on distinctions in their control and proliferation as well.(8) This needs to be understood in the context of the idea that world is not safe in the presence of nuclear weapons but comparatively safer in the presence of conventional weapons. Conventional arms have to be used enmasse in order to bring in mass scale destruction but largest degree of destruction cannot match the destruction caused by a low scale nuclear detonation. Moreover the use of conventional arms involves effective team work and communication between other units like the air force, naval units along with other land , air, cyber and space defense systems.(9) conventional arms use also needs the conventional forces to be technological aware and well trained capable of employing conventional arms.

The term “Crisis Stability” has been given a new meaning since the dawn of the nuclear age. It signifies the degree of incentivization for keeping the use of military force at its minimum and keeping a check on escalation at the same time.(10) It also encompasses behavioral aspect of war time, by soothing and cooling down emotions which particularly prevails in times of conflicts.

While in case of nuclear war, the prevalence of the fear of use of atomic bomb entices the parties to resolve the conflict on priority basis. By comparison the use of nuclear arms carries a very bigger stigma of destruction to the human race while in case of conventional arms there are always sympathies human rights violations but still not a large scale humiliation and condemnation that the use may face in future. This is demonstrated by the fact of history as no single nuclear war head has been delivered since 1945(11). But in case of conventional weapons it has remained in use consistently in conflicts like, the Egyptian and Israel, Yom Kipper war in 1973, the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s, the Afghan civil war of 1988-91, and the invasion of Iraq by the US led allied forces in the 1990s.

The duration and controllability of war are an important factors as Randall Forsberg, the antinuclear advocate states: “The main role of nuclear weapons has always been to deter conventional war among the world’s “big powers” (the USA, the USSR, the UK, France, West Germany, China, and Japan by posing a clear risk that such a war would escalate to nuclear war. If ballistic missiles were abolished, raising again the prime strategic question of the 1950s—could a conventional war be fought without going nuclear, and if it went nuclear, could it be won?—it would diminish nuclear deterrence of conventional war”(12)

Time factor is another important aspect of nuclear and conventional arms comparison while discussing one’s effects over other in creating stability in arms race. Because a lower yield small scale nuclear explosion will still destroy the command and control system, it will disrupt the communication very heavily and intelligence apparatus will be disturbed beyond limits. In case of conventional weapons there will be enough time to react and strike back, there is time to think and prepare but in case of nuclear weapons time gets compressed everything gets happened in fractions of time and reaction or striking back becomes impossible in short span of time(13). Another concerning factor in arms race stability is the disproportionate or inverse proportionality between the reduction of the two types of arms. The reduction in nuclear arms draws an increase in the conventional or non-nuclear arms. For example if the United States or the Soviet Union or the second or third tier countries decides to reduce their nuclear war heads by a certain amount. This will create a nuclear void which the same states may run to fill by increase in their non-nuclear, conventional arms stockpiles.(14) this can be substantiated by the statement published in The Nuclear Posture Review which states that, “fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years—including the growth of unrivaled US conventional military capabilities [and] major improvements in missile defenses . . . enable us to fulfill . . . objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons . . . without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals(15).

Going by the truth of this statement and if antinuclear administrators demands reduction in nuclear arsenal they must at the same time urge to reduce the conventional arms capabilities of states in order to strike a balance and achieve the ultimate goal of arms race stability (16). the real point is that even with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the urge or need for deterrence, extended deterrence and arms control regime on part of majority of big and smaller states won’t go away. Probably the control will become more complicated (17). This means that conventional arms control and nuclear arms control goes hand in hand. Neglecting one at the cost of another will always lead to the creation of another kind of instability.

The idea of reducing nuclear weapons has taken precedence over the reduction of conventional weapons in the nuclear age, but nuclear weapons are but a single component of the stability equation. Fewer nuclear weapons will definitely trigger conventional arms race on the grounds of deterrence and the logic the more-maybe-better of Scheleing (18), which primarily is meant for nuclear weapons will then become relevant for conventional weapons as well. All these factors signifies the fact that reduction and control in conventional arms is as much important and needed as nuclear non-proliferation and control.

Conclusion:

If we believe on the principle of history being the experience of nations in time then it won’t be unreasonable to believe that a world free of nuclear weapon will definitely experience increase in the standing armies, its conventional arms spending as a percentage of its gross domestic products (GDP), and increased rate of conflict. Hence the world will conflict ridden, than it would have been during the nuclear age. This stems from another historical fact that national leaders won’t think and act rationally when it comes to national interests, they don’t perform a cost and benefit analysis every time. They would rarely eliminate the risk for gaining the reward and above all the element of overvaluing one over the other thus leading to flawed decisions which will prove wrong not immediately but far latter than when the damage has been caused and the loss has been accrued.

It seems form this discussion that proponents of nuclear abolition have failed to foresee the unintended consequences of a nuclear free world. The unintended consequence of such an effort would be world safer for conventional conflicts. And the resultant proliferation of conflicts will definitely results an enormous increase in conflict-related casualties

References

1. Pacific, R. C. (2022, June 12). United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved December 12, 2023, from Conventional Weapons: https://www.unrcpd.org/conventional-weapons

2. Matthew Kroenig, “US Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation: Is There a Link?,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 2 (March 2016): 166–79, http://doi.org/bsjp.

3. “Russian General Calls for Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine against NATO,” Moscow Times,3 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-general -calls-for-preemptive-nuclear-strike-doctrine-against t-nato/506370.html

4. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1997): 54–86, http://doi.org/bsjq. 4. Quoted in Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?,” International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 133–66, http://doi .org/dbjfhs

5. Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 3.

6. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), http://doi.org/fqdjhg.

7. “Conventional Strike on Russia May Prompt Nuclear Response,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (website), 12 December 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/conventional-strike-russia -could-prompt-nuclear-retaliation/; TV-Novosti, “ ‘Deterrence Not Arms Race’: Russia Hints it May Develop Rival to U.S. Prompt Global Strike,” RT News, 11 September 2014, http:// rt.com/news/187092-russia-prompot-global-strike/; and Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, “Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Won’t Work,” Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 1 (March 2013): 107–22, http://doi.org/bsjr.

8. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 145–51.

9. Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider, and Marc L. Hutchison, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 2 (March 2005): 131–47, http://do (March 2005): 131–47, http://doi.org/dskxc5; Toby J. Rider, “Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition,” Journal of Politics 71, no. 2 (April 2009): 693–703, http://doi.org/c479hq; and George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” World Politics 38, no.1 (October 1985): 118–46, http://doi.org/cm3bvg.

10. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 39.

11. “At UN, Pakistan Slams ‘Nuclear Doublespeak,’ ” Pakistan Today, 6 April 2016, http:// www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/04/06/national/at-un-pakistan-slams-nuclear-doublespeak/.

12. See also, for instance, Russian concerns over US high-precision conventional weaponry. Sharon Squassoni, Andrew C. Kuchins, Steven Pifer, and Guy B. Roberts, “CSIS Track-II Dialogue on Limiting Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons” (panel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 4 September 2015), http://csis.org/event/limiting -non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-results-track-ii-dialogue.

13. Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Nuclear Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 14. See, for example, George Ball, “The Cosmic Bluff,” New York Revie

14. See, for example, George Ball, “The Cosmic Bluff,” New York Review of Books, 21 July 1983; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chapter 5; T. V. Paul, “Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 696–717, http://doi.org/dhdfdc; and Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 433–68, http://doi.org/d7n3zb.

15. 15. Randall Forsberg, “Abolishing Ballistic Missiles: Pros and Cons,” International Security 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 194, http://doi.org/b2v5dq.

16. 16. See George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 62–64.

17. 17. This refers not just to a sustained buildup of defense capabilities by two states but also to a situation where there is substantial evidence of action-reaction dynamics. Desmond Ball, “Arms Modernization in Asia: An Emerging Complex Arms Race,” in The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook, ed. Andrew T. H. Tan (London: Routledge, 2010), 30–51; Theresa Clair Smith, “Arms Race Instability and War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 253–84, http://doi.org/fqt3kt; Desmond Balll, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Harvey M. Sapolsky, US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (New York: Routledge, 2008); Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther 24 Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2017 in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); Richard A. Bitzinger and J. D. Kenneth Boutin, “China’s Defence Industries: Change and Continuity,” in Rising China: Power and Reassurance, ed. Ron Huisken (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2009), chapter 10; and Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (April 2010): 50–69, http:// www.jstor.org/stable/41288803.

18. 18. US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), v, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010 _Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf. 19. See also Christopher Ford, “A New Paradigm: